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BRITISH PROFIT FORECASTING SYSTEM: MODEL OR
MISTAKE FOR THE UNITED STATES?
Prior to the purchase of corporate stocks or securities, the
investor-be he institutional or individual-will scrutinize the de-
tailed financial history of the issuing company. From this anal-
ysis the investor will draw conclusions regarding the future per-
formance of the company. He "[Will attach due weight to any
projections of profits and earnings which the management of the
company may have seen fit to make available."'
To fully comprehend the importance of the profit forecast
to the British investor, it is important to examine the three com-
ponents that control the securitites regulation in that country.
These three factors include the Companies Act of 1948,2 the rela-
tive lack of marketing of securities in London,' and the dominant
position of the London Stock Exchange.4 In fact, the latter5 de-
1. Address by John Hull, Director General of the Panel on Take-Overs
and Mergers, before the Northwestern University Graduate School of Manage-
ment, April 2, 1973, copy provided by Northwestern University Graduate School
of Management, on file in CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. offices. [Hereinafter cited as
Hull Address].
2. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.38, as amended, Companies
Act of 1967, c.81. For example:
The Companies Act of 1948 contains regulations of the type one would
expect to see in a state corporation statute, as well as restrictions on
the public offer of securities.
Knauss, Securities Regulation in the United Kingdom, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 47, 49 (1971).
Sections 1-5 of the act contain the provisions for the formation of the com-
pany. Sections 37-46 of the act contain the necessary requirements for the
prospectus and the criminal liability involved for the misstatements in the
prospectus.
3. Dean Knauss states that:
[The second basic aspect of securities regulation in the United
Kingdom] is the relative lack of marketing of securities in England.
The customer's account representative is unknown in the London market,
and there are virtually no branch offices of the major brokerage firms.
In this regard, it is indicative that individual British stockbrokers,
in contrast to their American counterparts, usually are not compensated
within their firm on a commission basis. Instead, members and em-
ployees of the London firms are generally paid a salary or receive a
share of profits that has neither direct nor indirect relationship to the
volume of sales and trading.
Id., at 51-2.
4. The London Stock Exchange has adopted this position:
[S]ince there is no over-the-counter market in England as it is known
in the United States, there are few large issues of securities, other than
by "private companies," that do not obtain a quotation on the London
Exchange.
Id., at 51.
5. The pertinent rule for admission to the London Stock Exchange re-
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mands that a prospectus offering securities to the public include
a statement discussing the financial and trading prospects of the
company.6 The rationale of this rule is that "[T]he management
of a company must of necessity have a view as to the future prof-
itability of the company; the prospective investor . . . is en-
titled to be let into the secret."
7
This effort to voluntarily disclose financial predictions has
not been exhibited by the United States financial community.
However, there appears to be a strong current of new thought on
the entire subject of expanded financial disclosure," as evidenced
by the recent public hearings of the Securities and Exchange
Commission on Estimates, Forecasts and Projections of Economic
Performance.9 In a recent edition of the Wall Street Journal it
was predicted that:
[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission will break a 40-
year-old tradition and allow, perhaps even move to require,
companies to insert predictions of future sales and earnings
in reports they must file with the agency. 10
This decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission seems
to have been prompted by efforts to "[E]liminate advantages that
company insiders now enjoy because they see the internal forecasts
that every well-managed concern prepares."" With this in
mind, it is the purpose of this Comment to examine the present
quires:
A statement as to the financial and trading prospects of the Company
or Group, together with any material information which may be rele-
vant thereto, including, where known to the directors, special trade
factors or risks (if any) which are not mentioned elsewhere in the
prospectus and which are unlikely to be known or anticipated by the
general public, which could materially affect the profits, and details of
any waiver of future dividends.
FEDERATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, ADMISSION
OF SECURITIES TO QUOTATION 66, ser. 34 (London 1972). [Hereinafter cited as
ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO QUOTATION].
6. Grenside, Accountants' Reports on Profit Forecasts in the U.K., J.
ACCOuNTANCY 47 (May 1970) [hereinafter cited as Accountants' Reports].
7. See Hull Address, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Statement of D. Carmichael at Hearings on Estimatey,
Forecasts and Projections of Economic Performance before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 7, 1972).
10. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 11, 1972, at 12, col. 3. That prediction was
borne out by the Securities and Exchange Commission's statement that it had
decided to propose that companies be allowed to include profit forecasts in re-
ports filed with the agency. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 1973, at 2, col. 2.
11. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 11, 1972, at 12, col. 3.
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guidelines of profit forecasting in the United Kingdom and then
to ascertain whether such a practice could be implemented in the
United States.
I. THE ENGLISH SYSTEM
As defined by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales, a profit forecast is "[A]ny estimate of finan-
cial results made (a) in advance of the completion of audited fi-
nancial statements for an expired accounting period, (b) for a
current (or unexpired) accounting period, or (c) for a future
accounting period."12  The Institute has indicated that most com-
panies prepare forecasts for their internal use only, although there
are times when, for specific reasons,'13 these forecasts are disclosed
to outsiders. At such times, accountants are asked to analyze
the forecasts and report their findings to the board of directors.'4
Forecasts appear in the United Kingdom in two instances:
first, when a company desires to be listed on the London Stock
Exchange; and second, during a struggle for corporate control
which is called a take-over bid.'5 In an effort to clarify the prob-
lems associated with each situation they will be investigated in-
dividually.
There are two situations in which a British company seeks to
have its securities quoted on the London Stock Exchange: (1)
when no portion of its capital has been quoted;'" and, (2) when
some part of its capital has already been quoted.' 7  It should be
noted that British firms rarely "go public" on a purely promo-
12. INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, Ac-
COUNTANTS' REPORTS ON PROFIT FORECASTS (S15) 1 (London 1969). [Herein-
after cited as ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT ON PROFTr FORECASTS]. This report re-
places Statement S1I issued in 1968.
13. As will be discussed later in this Comment, one of the reasons why the
accountants might be willing to share the internal forecast with outsiders is to
prevent a take-over. See text accompanying note 37 infra.
14. See ACCOUNTANTS' REPORTS ON PROFIT FORECASTS, supra note 12.
15. Referred to as a tender offer in the United States. Address by Eli
Goldston, President, Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Hearing on Use of Earnings Forecasts, Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 7, 1972). (Copy provided by Douglas R. Carmichael, Director of
Technical Research of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants on
file with the CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. offices). [Hereinafter cited as Goldston Ad-
dress].
16. ADMIsSION OF SECURITIES TO QUOTATION, supra note 5, at 64.
17. Id., at 71. Issues already quoted on the London Stock Exchange
are subject to a forecast statement similar to that required for initial quotation.
That is:
A statement as to the financial and trading prospects of the Company
1973
3
Wahl: British Profit Forecasting System: Model or Mistake for the Unite
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
tional basis. Typically, a new enterprise relies on merchant
bankers18 or private investors for its capital during the first five
to ten years of its existence, so that when it goes public it has a
record on which forecasts may be based. 9 Therefore, "[B]y the
time the general public is approached for capital, the situation is
quite different from an American 'hot issue' which often may
represent a purely promotional assembly of public capital to ex-
ploit an untested idea."20
England's financial community has not limited use of the
profit forecast merely to the prevention of "hot issue" fever. It
has instituted several other mechanical practices which work to
defeat the usual financial speculator. For instance, an investor is
required to make full payment in advance when subscribing to
a new issue.21 Despite this requirement, the new issues are vastly
oversubscribed and the extent of prorating is not immediately
known. As a result, the investor who wants to turn an immediate
profit by reselling a new issue finds his funds effectively impound-
ed. Since he faces the prospect of pro rata assignment of the
available shares, he is extremely unlikely to indulge in precipitous
resale.22
An analysis of a British Profit Forecast indicates that it is a
condensed version of what the American financial community
would consider necessary in such a document. 23  Normally, the
British version contains only:
or Group, together with any material information which may be rele-
vant thereto, including all special trade factorg or risks (if any)
which are not mentioned elsewhere in the prospectus and which are
unlikely to be known or anticipated by the general public, which could
materially affect the profits, and details of any waiver of future divi-
dends.
Id., at 73.
18. Dev and Webb, The Accuracy of Company Profit Forecasts, 4 J. Bus.
FINANCE 30 (1972). See Table 4. [Hereinafter cited as Dev and Webb].
19. Goldston Address, supra note 15. One of the areas in which the
Federation of Stock Exchanges requires a report by the auditors of a company
is:
[W]ith respect to the profits or losses of the Company in respect
of each of the ten completed financial years immediately preceding the
publication of the Prospectus or in respect of each of the years since
the incorporation of the Company, if this occurred less than ten years
prior to such publication; and, if in respect of a period ending on a
date earlier than three months before such publication no accounts
have been made up, a statement of the fact;. ...
See ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO QUOTATIONS, supra note 5, at 67.
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[A] forecast of profits before tax, estimated taxes on the
forecasted profit, projected dividend payment dates and
amounts, and the dividend yield and price earnings ratio
calculated by reference to the offer price. The information
normally relates to the expected profitability of the current
year and sometimes may be issued only one or two months
before [fiscal] year end.
24
Once the profit forecast is completed by the company and
is ready for inclusion in the prospectus or circular,25 the merchant
bankers request that the accountant report to them on the current
trading, future prospect and working capital position of the com-
pany in a comfort letter.26 This instrument is a private communi-
cation between the accountant and the merchant banker,27 de-
lineating the assumptions on which the profit forecast has been
prepared, and also emphasizing that the reported forecast is the
An accountants' report on the accounting bases and calculations for
profit forecasts might, in appropriate circumstances, where there are
no grounds for qualifications, read as follows:
To the directors of X Ltd.
We have reviewed the accounting bases and calculations for the profit
forecasts of X Ltd. (for which the directors are solely responsible) for
the periods . . . set out on pages . . . of this circular. The forecasts
include results shown by unaudited interim accounts for the period.
In our opinion the forecasts, so far as the accounting bases and
calculations are concerned, have been properly compiled on the footing
of the assumptions made by the Board set out on page .... of this
circular and are presented on a basis consistent with the accounting
practices normally adopted by the company.
See ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT ON PROFIT FORECASTS, supra note 12, at 64. See also
Appendix, infra. An Example of a British Profit Forecast is exhibited in
Damant, A Note on Practice in the United Kingdom Financial Forecasting by
Companies, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL 44, 45 (Sept.-Oct. 1972).
24. Carmichael, REPORTING ON FORECASTS, A U.K. PERSPECTIVE 4 (1972).
This was a paper presented by Douglas Carmichael, Director of Technical Re-
search of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants at the Col-
loquim on Accounting and Information Systems, Graduate School of Manage-
ment, University of California, Los Angeles, August, 1972 [hereinafter cited as
REPORTING ON FORECASTS]. Copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. offices.
25. One reason why a circular must be sent to shareholders is:
When a quoted company acquires an unquoted company and the size
of the latter is significant in relation to the former-broadly speaking 15
percent or more of related figures-a circular must be sent to share-
holders giving particulars of the transaction. This will include an ac-
countants' report on the profits and net assets of the company being
acquired, together with a statement by the directors as to trading
prospects. The accountants' consent to the inclusion of their report in
the circular must be given so that in effect the same considerations
apply as in the case of a prospectus.
See Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 48.
26. See REPORTING ON FORECASTS, supra note 24, at 5.
27. See Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 48. The author points
out that the comfort letter is not to be quoted or referred to in whole or in part
in any literature connected with the sale of the securities.
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sole responsibility of the directors of that company. 28 The letter
contains comments, reservations, or both, as deemed pertinent by
the accountant. The conclusions, if any, are invariably couched
in the form of a negative assurance, such as "[I]ncreases in the
level of manufacturing costs for the remainder of the year will be
kept within the margin of 2 percent allowed for in the estimates.
29
The prospectus forecast traditionally has been quite conserv-
ative. This makes it possible for a new issue to achieve its fore-
cast without much difficultly and to establish a credible record
from the outset.8" However, the penalty for failing to reach the
projected forecast is a loss of status which adversely affects the
reputation of the company and its advisors. 31  An inaccurate
forecast could have a pejorative effect on both the market value
of the shares and on the cost of raising additional capital. Con-
sequently, companies make a diligent effort to ensure achievement
of the forecast. Reported profits are often adjusted upward to
avoid falling short of the forecast, but they are rarely adjusted
downward. This practice manifests the English financial phil-
osophy of ensuring that fledgling companies have a successful in-
gress into the market place.
One authority reports that merchant bankers have been
known to voluntarily refund the purchase price of stock when
one of the new companies fails. 32  This same author concludes
that forecasting accuracy deteriorates rapidly as forecast intervals
are extended. 3  The accuracy of profit forecasts in prospectus
situations varies insignificantly despite the passing of portions of
the year for which the forecast was prepared. Apparently, the
reason is that the internal adjustment of the projected figures
achieves the desired result. 34  Therefore, a profit forecast in a
prospectus is inherently unreliable because it is designed to be
28. Id.
29. Hull Address, supra note 1.
30. Goldston Address, supra note 15.
31. Dev and Webb, supra note 18, at 29.
32. Address by Douglas Carmichael, Director of Technical Research of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants before the Securities and
Exchange Commission Public Hearings on Estimates, Forecasts and Projections
of Economic Performance, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 1972 (copy provided by
Douglas Carmichael and is on file with the CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. office).
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easily met or exceeded."5
In the past two decades the British have experienced in-
creased activity in the field of take-over bids and mergers.3 6 An
unwelcome bid is opposed with financial manuevers rather than
legal proceedings. One such financial tactic is the inclusion of
statements regarding future prospects and profits distributed to
the shareholders by the board of directors of each company in-
volved in the take-over attempt.'
7
During the late 1950's, many contested bids led to embittered
corporate factions and harsh criticism from the financial commu-
nity. As a result, the "City"-the geographically compact finan-
cial community of London 8"-recognized two alternatives: im-
plementing legal constraints or developing a system based on a
code of self-discipline.3 9  The "City" selected the latter course of
action and in September, 1967, the Governor of the Bank of
England established the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers.4 °
35. Id., at 29. Sometimes a profit forecast is adjusted in the following
manner:
Having arrived at a forecast that is as realistic as possible and that is
approved by all concerned, a contingency discount is then applied to this
realistic forecast to produce the figure that will actually be used in the
prospectus. The size of the discount will be governed by how much
uncertainty there is over the achievement of the profit forecast (which
in turn is primarily determined by the nature of the company's busi-
ness and how much of the financial year has elapsed by the time of the
flotation) and by the caution of the directors and the sponsors of the
issue; the normal range is 7 -10o%.
Harford, Pricing a Flotation, 1 J. Bus. FINANCE 17 (1969).
36. See Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 49. For example:
Table 1






37. See REPORTING ON FORECASTS, supra note 24, at 5.
38. See Goldston Address, supra note 15, at 2.
39. See Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 49.
40. The basic tenets of the City Code are set forth below:
The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers. . . is issued on the au-
thority of the City Working Party, a body originally set up by the Gov-
ernor of the Bank of England in 1959 for the purpose of considering
good business practice in the conduct of take-overs and mergers. The
City Working Party consists of representatives of the bodies named
below.
The City Code has not and does not seek to have the force of law.
It represents the collective opinion of those professionally concerned in
the field of take-overs and mergers on a range of business standards.
Those who wish to have the facilities of the securities markets in the
United Kingdom available to them should conduct themselves in matters
relating to take-overs and mergers according to the City Code; those
7
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In March, 1968, the City Code of Take-Overs and Mergers
first appeared as the definitive guideline for take-overs and merg-
who do not so conduct themselves cannot expect to enjoy those facili-
ties and will find that they are withheld. The privileges and disci-
plines described herein apply in the first place to those who are actively
engaged in the securities market in all its aspects but they will also
apply to Directors of public companies and their professional advisers
(in so far as they advise on the transactions in question), even where
they are not directly affiliated to the bodies who are responsible for
this document.
The authors of the City Code are satisfied that sufficient adver-
tisement has been given to previous editions and will be given to this
edition to make it difficult to plead ignorance as an excuse for non-
compliance. The provisions of the City Code fall into two categories.
On the one hand, it enunciates general principles of conduct to be
observed in take-over and merger transactions; these general principles
are a codification of good standards of commercial behaviour and should
have an obvious and universal application. On the other hand, the
City Code lays down a series of rules, some of which are no more than
examples of the application of the general principles and others are rules
of procedure designed to govern specific forms of take-over and merger
transactions practiced in the United Kingdom.
The City Working Party points out that some of these general
principles, based as they are upon a concept of equity between one
shareholder and another, while readily understandable in the City
and by those concerned with the securities markets generally would not
easily lend themselves to legislation. The City Code is therefore framed
in non-technical language and is, as a measure of self-discipline, ad-
ministered and enforced by the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, a
body representative of the City itself. The duty of the Panel is the
enforcement of good business standards, not the enforcement of law.
The Panel, as the administering body, works on a day-to-day basis
through its executive, headed by the Director General. The Director
General or his Deputy are available at all times to give rulings on
points of interpretation of the City Code. Companies and their
advisers are invited to make full use of this service. Consultations
are confidential.
In the event of disagreement, companies or their advisers may ap-
peal to the full Panel, which can be convened in a matter of hours to
review the executive decision. The findings of the full Panel on a
matter of interpretation of the City Code will be final.
If there appears to be a breach of the City Code, the Director
General will invite the alleged offender to appear before the full Panel
for a hearing. If the full Panel finds that there has been a breach it
may have recourse to private reprimand or public censure or, in a more
flagrant case, to further action designed to deprive the offender tempo-
rarily or permanently of his ability to enjoy the facilities of the securities
markets. No finding of a breach of the Code nor any reprimand,
censure or further action will take place without the alleged offender
having the opportunity to answer the allegation and to bring witnesses
and the right of appeal to the Appeal Committee of the Panel. Pro-
ceedings are, however, always informal and no legal representation is
permitted.
The permanent Chairman of the Appeal Committee is Lord
Pearce and for each individual case the Appeal Committee will have
three further members, one of whom so far as is possible will be a
representative of the body to which the alleged offender is affiliated.
Upon the full Panel arriving at an adverse decision in a disciplinary
matter the offender will have two days in which to consider whether he
wishes to appeal (during which time no public statement of the findings
will be made). If he decides not to appeal, publication (if that is so
decided) will take place. If he decides to make use of the appeal pro-
cedure, no publication will take place until the procedure is completed
and, in the case of a successful appeal, only if the appellant so desires.
The City Code was drafted with quoted public companies particu-
Vol. 4
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ers. 41  This document outlined the various problems associated
with profit forecasting and the related limits to which the ac-
countants could report their findings. Within this particular
draft, it was recommended that the accountants should not per-
mit their names to become "associated" with published forecasts.
The rationale of this conservative approach was that associating
a well-known name with a forecast, however remotely, might lend




In effect the accountants were allowed to analyze the profit
forecasts but the investors were not allowed access to those anal-
yses." This restriction on the disclosure of profit projections
created unrest in the British financial community. The Panel
recognized the problem and realized that if this concept of profit
forecasting were to succeed, drastic revisions would be necessary.
In 1969 the original Code was redrafted and the prevailing spirit of
this revised Code is best exemplified by the first general principle
stated in bold print:
[Plersons engaged in such transactions should be aware that
the spirit as well as the precise wording of these General
larly in mind. Nevertheless, since unquoted public companies make
use of the facilities of the securities markets, these too will be expected
to observe the spirit of the City Code and where appropriate the letter.
The general principles may also be relevant to transactions in the
shares of private companies but the Panel will not claim any author-
ity in such cases.
Neither the City Code nor the Panel is concerned with the evalu-
ation of the financial or commercial advantages or disadvantages of a
take-over or merger proposition which must be decided by the com-
pany and its shareholders.
The Panel is available for consultation at any time before or dur-
ing a take-over or merger transaction.
Issued on the authority of-
The Accepting Houses Committee
The Association of Investment Trust Companies
The Association of Unit Trust Companies
The British Insurance Association
The Committee of London Clearing Bankers
The Confederation of British Industry
The Issuing Houses Association
The National Association of Pension Funds
The Stock Exchange, London
CiTY WORKING PARTY, THE CIr CoDE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 3-5 (Lon-
don 1972). [Hereinafter cited as CITY CODE].
41. Id. A revised Code appeared in April 1969 followed by the most re-
cent revision in February 1972. From time to time the Panel issues "practice
notes" as supplements to the Code.
42. See Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 50.
43. Id.
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Principles and of the ensuing Rules must be observed. 4 4
Under the revised rules, persons accused of violating the Code
are brought before an appeals tribunal which is empowered to
privately or publicly censure misconduct.
45
Another important facet of this edition of the Code is the
requirement that the accountants' report be published in the take-
over document.46 Rule 16, dealing with the individual responsi-
bilities of both the accountants and the directors, in effect, pre-
empts the negative assurance doctrine discussed above.47  From
this point on the responsibility of approving the profit forecast is
placed squarely on the shoulders of the accountants. If for any
reason they are dissatisfied with the reasonableness of the fore-
cast or the assumptions contained therein, they are free to qualify
their report or withhold their consent.48
Thus, the English Institute acknowledges that within speci-
44. CrrY CODE, supra note 40 at 9.
45. Id.
46. Id., at 14. This requirement is contrary to the first technical release of
the City Working Party which specified that the accountants' report had to be
submitted in writing to the directors and the Panel, but that it would not be
published in the take-over document.
47. Rule 16 states:
Without in any way detracting from the imperative necessity of
maintaining the highest standards of accuracy and fair representation
in all communications to shareholders in a take-over or merger transac-
tion, attention is particularly drawn in this connection to profit fore-
casts and asset valuations.
Notwithstanding the obvious hazard attached to the forecasting of
profits, any profit forecasts must be compiled with the greatest possible
care by the Directors whose sole responsibility they are.
When profit forecasts appear in any document addressed to
shareholders in connection with an offer, the assumptions, including
the commercial assumptions, upon which the Directors have based their
profit forecasts, must be stated in the document.
The accounting bases and calculations for the forecasts must be
examined and reported on by the auditors or consultant accountants.
Any financial adviser mentioned in the document must also report on
the forecasts. The accountants' report and, if there is an adviser, his
report, must be contained in such document and be accompanied by a
statement that the accountants and, where relevant, the adviser, have
given and not withdrawn their consent to publication.
Wherever profit forecasts appear in relation to a period in which
trading has already commenced, the latest unaudited profit figures
which are available in respect of the expired portion of that trading
period together with comparable figures for the preceding year must be
stated. Alternatively, if no figures are available, that fact must be stated.
When revaluations of assets are given in connection with an offer
the Board should be supported by the opinion of a named independent
professional expert and the basis of valuation clearly stated. The
document should also state that the expert has given and not withdrawn
his consent to the publication of his name therein.
Id.
48. See Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 51.
Vol. 4
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fied limits accountants may assume responsibility for an objective
review of the accounting bases and of the calculations for profit fore-
casts. They may also form an opinion4" as to whether the fore-
casts have been properly compiled from the underlying assump-
tions and data, and as to whether they have been presented on a
basis consistent with the accounting principles used in the previous
financial statements of the company. 50
Other provisions of the Code51 define precisely the intended
role of the reporting accountant. That responsibility encompasses
an analysis of the assumptions contained within the profit forecast.
However, it must not create any impression that he has accepted
the responsibility for the ultimate accuracy or realization of the
forecast.5" The Code offers little assistance as to what is meant
by the phrase "assumptions, including the commercial assumptions,
upon which the Directors [of the particular company involved] have
based their profit forecasts". 58 As would be expected, it has been
49. See note 23 supra.
50. See Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 51.
51. See CITY CODE, supra note 40, at 43.
52. Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 51.
53. See CITY CODE, supra note 40, at 43. The City Code states that:
Any document or advertisement addressed to shareholders under
these headings must be treated with the same standards of care
with regard to the statements made therein as if it were a prospectus
within the meaning of the Companies Act of 1948. This applies
whether the document or advertisement is issued by the company di-
rect or by an adviser on its behalf. Each document or advertisement
addressed to shareholders of the offeree company must state that the
Directors of the offeror and/or, where appropriate, the offeree com-
pany, have taken all reasonable care to ensure that the facts stated and
opinions expressed therein are fair and accurate and, where appropriate,
that no material factors or considerations have been omitted. It must
also be stated that all Directors (including any who may have dele-
gated detailed supervision of the document) jointly and severally accept
responsibility accordingly. If any Director does not so do, this must be
formally stated in the document or advertisement.
A copy of the authority on behalf of the Board of the company for
the issue of such document must be lodged with the Panel.
Id., at 13. See also note 47 supra. Nevertheless, there is a certain degree of
flexibility built in to the Code. For example:
From the standpoint of the Directors making the forecast and of
their advisers it is also right that they should be able to explain the
uncertainties and so protect themselves from subsequent unjustified
criticism if the forecast is not achieved.
The forecast and the assumptions on which it is based are the sole
responsibility of the Directors. However, a duty is placed on the
financial advisers to discuss the assumptions with their client and to
satisfy themselves that the forecast has been made with due care and
consideration. One of the duties placed on the auditors or consultant
accountants is to satisfy themselves that the forecasts, so far as the
accounting bases and calculations are concerned, have been properly
compiled on the footing of the assumptions made.
Although the accountants have no responsibility for the assumptions,
they will as a result of their review be in a position to advise the coin-
1973
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interpreted in a variety of ways.54 Why the Code refused to define
"assumptions" is best explained by emphasizing that profit forecasts
necessarily depend on subjective judgments. These judgments are
subject to a substantial number of uncertainties which increase dra-
matically as more time is included within the forecasting period. 5
Profit forecasts are not capable of confirmation and verification as
are the financial statements which represent the results of a com-
pleted accounting period.
The critical nature of the work performed in detailing a fore-
cast cannot be equated properly with a year-end financial audit.
Such work may be described as taking an "audit approach", for an
audit is an error-oriented critical investigation. In his work on
the year-end audit, the accountant focuses his attention on speci-
fic areas which he feels could invalidate it. He applies a similar
analytic approach as he reviews the profit forecast in his search
for factors that could vitiate the validity of the forecast.
It is inherent in the nature of forecasts that only in the most
unusual situations will they be completely accurate. If users are
to maintain confidence in them, however, they must be reason-
ably accurate in a majority of cases. The results of a recent
pany on what assumptions should be listed in the circular and the way
in which they should be described. The financial advisers and account-
ants obviously have substantial influence on the information given in a
circular about assumptions. Neither should allow an assumption to
be published which appears to them to be unrealistic (or one to be
omitted which appears to them to be important) without commenting
on it in their reports.
Id., at 42-43.
54. Id., at 43. The City Code provides limited guidance for purposes of
drafting assumptions:
It is suggested that the following general rules should apply to the
selection and drafting of assumptions:-
(a) the reader should be able to understand their implications
and so be helped in forming a judgement as to the reasonable-
ness of the forecast and to the main uncertainties attaching
to it;
(b) the assumptions should be, wherever possible, specific rather
than general, definite rather than vague;
(c) all-embracing assumptions and those relating to the general
accuracy of the estimates should be avoided;
(d) the assumptions should relate only to matters which may have
a material bearing on the forecast.
There is however a need for brevity and simplicity which may restrict
adherence to the foregoing in every detail. There may be occasions,
particularly when the forecast relates to a period already ended, when
no assumptions are required.
Id. at 45.
55. See also Accountants' Reports, supra note 6, at 51. See AccouNTANT'S
REPORTS ON PROFTr FORECASTS, supra note 12.
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study5" indicate that of 245 forecasts made during the period,57
226 were reviewed for possible participation in the study. Six-
teen were discarded, leaving a sample of 210 forecasts of which
170 (eighty-one percent) achieved their goals within a margin
of plus or minus ten percent. Of the forty failures, to date nine-
teen of them have been investigated and only three (sixteen
percent) have failed to provide a satisfactory explanation.5" Ad-
ditional research of the sample revealed that twenty-three percent
of the forecasts were "spot on" (within a plus or minus two per-
cent). 9 There was a tendency for forecasts to be conservative;
more forecasts were exceeded (fifty-three percent) than not
(twenty-four percent). 60 Perhaps one explanation of these results
is that a forecast is more likely to be exaggerated in a bid situa-
tion in an effort to fend off an unwelcome bid. As a result, the
Panel applied considerable pressure on directors to project the
best possible results of future operations to prevent a built-in
"cushion" in future forecasts.61
This informal sanction by the Panel apparently achieved a
certain degree of success. One who fails to adhere to the recog-
nized norms may be ostracized from the investment community.
In such a closely-knit financial community as the "City" banish-
ment spells certain disaster; thus, the necessity for stringent legal
enforcement is lessened considerably.
One of the most striking differences between the investment
communities of the United States and the United Kingdom is the
varying degree of legal liability and the necessity for legal sanc-
tions.62 In the United Kingdom accountants are given broad dis-
cretionary power in that they are self-enforcers of the policy of
expanded financial disclosure. However, their possible legal ex-
posure is minimized as a result of two factors: British attorneys
cannot be retained on a contingent fee basis; and, class actions
and derivative suits are not possible.63 Accordingly, there is gen-
56. WESTWICK, THE AccuRAcY OF PROFIT FORECASTS IN BID SITUATIONS
(London 1972). [Hereinafter cited as AccuRAcY OF PROFIT FORECASTS].
57. Id., at 1. The forecasting period extended from May 1, 1969 to on
or before September 30, 1970.
58. Id.
59. Id., at 3, Table 3.
60. Id., at 3. See also Table 2, at 2.
61. See REPORTING ON FORECASTS, supra note 24, at 7.
62. Id., at 20.
63. Id.
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erally a lesser propensity to litigate in the United Kingdom. In
addition, in litigation English barristers are not hampered by the
burden of proof concept present in the Securities Act of 1933."'
Moreover, "[t]hird party allegations against accountants come
under the list of things which are 'just not done' in the 'City' ".65
The English system has recognized the importance of the ac-
counting profession and its vital role in preparing a document
which will assist the investigating public at large. By their ef-
forts, the accountants (rather than attorneys) ensure the accuracy
and fairness of the assumptions and financial data projected by
the directors of the reporting companies to all interested parties.
Theoretically, this system approaches the extensive, unbiased dis-
closure of financial data desired by American investors. There-
fore, in light of the possible adaptation of this British program to
the United States, an analysis of current American forecasting dis-
closure practices is appropriate.
II. ADAPTABILITY OF THE PROFIT FORECAST
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Manager, Accountant and S.E.C.: Varied Standpoints
The British profit forecasting system has no direct counter-
part on the American financial scene. This makes a comparative
study difficult. The Kearney study,66 which was prepared for the
64. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
65. REPORTING ON FORECASTS, supra note 24, at 20.
66. See A.T. KEARNEY, INC. AND SIDLEY & AUSTIN, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
BUSINESS FORECASTS (1972) [hereinafter cited as DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORE-
CASTS]. The purposes of the study are set forth in its introductory paragraphs:
Some spokesmen of the investing public are demanding both more
and better information, not only concerning the historical results of
corporations, but also as to their future prospects. One of these de-
mands is that United States corporations publish their internal forecasts.
In the ideal form, this statement would be prepared in sufficient detail
to allow a party external to the organization to develop a reasonably
accurate independent projection of the company's profit prospects for the
period covered by the forecast. The spokesmen argue that investors
should not have to rely on security analysts to project earnings, but
should be informed directly by management of the qualified expectations
of the company.
The United Kingdom's experience with this type of disclosure is
submitted as proof of the practicality of this proposal. However, this
has little or no relevance to the situation in the U.S., since the U.K. ex-
perience is limited to the inclusion of a profit forecast in prospectuses
prepared only in connection with the physical sale of securities or docu-
ments prepared in connection with a takeover bid. The auditors are
required to comment only on the forecast data included in takeover
and merger circulars: their duties are limited to seeing that the fore-
cast is properly prepared on the basis of the assumptions given and
that the mathematical calculations are correct. Even with this limited
experience in the publication of profit forecasts, among those actually
Vol. 4
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Financial Executives Institute on the use of profit forecasts by
American companies and the extent of their disclosure to the in-
vesting public, has recently been completed. This analysis
8 7
serves as the focal point for a discussion regarding business fore-
casts68 from the American corporate manager's standpoint. Em-
familiar with the situation there is a divergence of opinion as to whether
the results in England are satisfactory.
Corporate managers are concerned with maintaining a proper bal-
ance of information that is disclosed to the public. They recognize that
investors require information concerning the corporation in order to
make their investment decisions. However, they are deeply concerned
that disclosure of excessive information will be misleading.
Further, most executives are concerned with the problem of com-
municating intelligently with the public. Some feel that confusion
over technicalities of historical financial reporting has resulted in a
credibility gap between corporations and the investing public. They
fear that internal forecast publication might enlarge this gap.
On the other hand, a few managers feel that the investing public
has a right to management's internal forecasts. They feel that this
data should be disclosed in as great detail as possible for reasons that
are often unique to their particular organizations.
The Financial Executives Research Foundation wanted to deter-
mine corporate management's viewpoint. They felt that prior to any
decisions by regulatory bodies as to the desirability and feasibility of
publishing forecasts there must be a weighing of the advantages and
disadvantages as seen by the financial managers. In addition, the
Foundation was concerned with documenting the availability and use
of internal company forecasts. In this regard it commissioned the
management consulting firm of A.T. Kearney, Inc. to undertake this
research project.
Id., at 1-3.
67. The objectives of the Kearney Study are illustrated as follows:
In determining the feasibility of public disclosure of internal fore-
casts it is essential to take into consideration the interests of both the
suppliers and the users of the information. Accordingly, the purpose
of this study was to concentrate on the proprietary interests with regard
to these issues. These interests were translated into three specific
study objectives:
1. To determine the availability and the nature of forecast data
currently used in companies.
2. To define the internal uses for which management develops fore-
casts and the extent to which forecasts for use by other groups might
need to be constructed differently.
3. To ascertain corporate management's views of the advantages
and the disadvantages of furnishing forecasts in a public presentation.
This research effort did not attempt to include a study of either
the validity of the demand for forecast information or the utility value
of this information to the investing public. It was felt that the docu-
mentation of forecast availability and management's appraisal of the
practical implications of forecast disclosure were a manageable portion
of the total problem.
Id., at 5.
68. Various terms of art were defined in the Kearney Study:
Recognizing that the terms "forecast," "budget," and "profit plan-
ning" are used differently from company to company, arbitrary defini-
tions (solely for the purpose of filling out the questionnaire, [sic] were
developed as follows:
Budgets: Financial planning information applicable to both the current
fiscal year and to the next complete fiscal year.
Forecasts: Financial planning information applicable to any fiscal year
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phasis was placed on comparing the similarities between the Brit-
ish and American approaches, 9 to discern the feasibility of ad-
apting the former to meet the requirements and needs of the lat-
ter's investing public.
70
The study revealed"' that today's managers utilize forecasts
to assist them in identifying the internal company variances72 that
69. In order to achieve this desired result, specific forecasts were requested:
The development of the questionnaire required the identification
of the types of forecasts to be included. From the wide range of pos-
sibilities, nine types of forecasts were selected for inclusion in the first
section of the questionnaire.
1. Corporate Earnings
2. Earnings by Division
3. Corporate Sales (Units or Dollar Values)
4. Sales (Units or Dollar Value) by Division
5. Corporate Expenses
6. Expenses by Division
7. Expenses by Corporate Chart of Accounts
8. Changes in Capital Structure
9. Changes in Productivity
Id., at 4-5.
70. The researchers sought answers to the following questions as to how
management utilized its present internal forecasts:
1. What forecasts are being prepared by companies at present,
whether for internal planning and control purposes only or for public
dissemination?
2. What are the typical periods of time covered by the various
forms of forecasts?
3. How often are the forecasts revised?
4. In what form are the forecasts usually presented?
5. To what extent is external assistance employed in preparing
forecasts?
6. To what extent is there documentation of the assumptions that
typically underlie forecasts?
Id., at 9-10. See also note 66 supra, Table II, at 11.
71. The consulting firm also discovered that:
If a publication of forecasts using a range format were made a
requirement, it appears as through [sic] over 90 percent of the companies
would have to alter their existing procedures.
Id., at 16.
72. The research team qualified the yearly variance in each one of the
forecasts presented to the companies:
Rank(1) Type of Forecast Cumulative Percent Variance(
2 )
5% 10% 15% 20% 21%+
1 Corporate Expense 65% 90% 97% 98% 2%
2 Expenses by Cor-
porate Chart of
Accounts 55% 84% 92% 98% 2%
3 Corporate Sales 53% 84% 93% 95% 5%
4 Changes in Capital
Structure 53% 84% 92% 95% 5%
5 Expenses by
Division 53% 82% 95% 97% 2%
6 Changes in Pro-
ductivity 47% 77% 92% 97% 3%
7 Sales by Division 36% 74% 88% 94% 6%
8 Corporate Earnings 37% 70% 80% 87% 13%
Vol. 4
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occur as a result of changing external business conditions which
affect anticipated corporate goals.73  Once these variances are
recognized, management adjusts the forecast to more accurately
reflect the short term planning and strategy of the company. 74  In
order to effectively revise the forecasts, essentially all levels of
management must become involved; the forecast is but another
tool used by management for motivational purposes.
7 5
The current disclosure practice of the American financial
community indicated from this survey can be succinctly stated:
internal company forecasts are not released for public scrutiny.
In fact, many companies have established guidelines regarding
informational disclosure. 76  For example, the study reveals an
extremely negative attitude on the part of the financial managers
toward the release of any forecast. 77  There was no correlation
between sales volume, industry classification, the assessment of
9 Earnings by
Division 22% 58% 73% 82% 18%
(1) Based upon cumulative variance at 10%.
(2) Percent variances represent plus or minus difference.
Id., at 28.
73. Id., at 22.
74. It is significant to note the absence of external auditor assistance in
the preparation of forecasts:
The companies surveyed do not utilize external auditor assistance
in the preparation of budgets or forecasts.
During the interviews most companies questioned the ability of
auditors to certify their forecasts. They stated that the forecasts are
based on numerous assumptions which emanate from all lower levels of
management. In order to certify these forecasts, the auditors would
have to reconstruct the basic figures with all the people involved in
the forecasting process. This procedure would require more auditors
than are presently used for auditing purposes and would be costly.
See DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 17.
75. All managers stated that forecasts are one of their most essential
management tools. Forecasts were described as "energizers of people."
They viewed the forecast as a means of insuring that all management
levels become invoved in forward planning for their particular spheres of
activity. In addition, this anticipation of internal and external changes
facilitates the efficient allocation of a company's resources in terms of
finances and manpower.
Id., at 22.
76. The Kearney Study promulgates interesting statistics:
The publication of written guidelines is a function of the size of
the company. While 57 percent of the large companies publish guide-
lines, only 22 percent of the smaller companies do. The majority of
the companies who have guidelines specifically mentioned profit fore-
casts in them.
Id., at 32.
77. The analysis showed that:
The reasons for the opposition tend to fall into five major cate-
gories: competitive implications, the use of the forecast, the credibility
of the forecast, the legal problems with regard to release, and the "games-
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the financial community's earnings per share projections, or the
reliability of their internal forecasts and this negative attitude.7"
Rather all companies, regardless of classification, expressed con-
siderable concern over the possible legal consequences of the re-
lease of their internal forecasts.
Perhaps the overriding concern of these companies is that in-
creased dissemination of forecasts will develop a lack of credibil-
ity79 by the investing public. To avoid this possibility, many com-
panies indicated they would alter their managerial pattern to ne-
gate the usefulness of the forecast. The forecast would be ex-
tremely conservative to insure successful achievement of the pro-
jected goals. This is the same philosophy employed by the Eng-
lish companies. This conservative concept would not be favored
by the members of the American financial community since it
would reduce the community's analysts to the role of second-
guessing the internal forecasts of management.80
The employment of subterfuge with respect to public fore-
casts would assume a dominant role in this area, with more em-
phasis being placed upon the actual date of publication than on
the contents of the document itself. If this approach were adopt-
ed, the forecasts themselves would tend to be completely dis-
counted and a greater effort would have to be exerted in extract-
ing "secret" information from the reporting companies. There-
fore, without a gradual educational involvement by both manage-
ment and the investing public as to the strengths and weaknesses
of profit forecasting, the existence of a credibility gap is assured.
The accountant maintains a similar viewpoint regarding the
necessity of profit forecasts. 8 ' All investors would benefit if
78. Id.
79. The companies surveyed:
[C]ited as factors the difficulty in presenting intelligible audited his-
torical operating statements, the amount of time required by the in-
vestor to truly understand the factors accurately, and the myriad of in-
ternal and external developments which would necessitate frequent
changes to the forecast. If the public disclosure of internal forecasts
results in a loss of confidence in management by the investing public,
the costs to the company and the security industry are incalculable.
In order to prevent this from occurring and to minimize the harmful
effects on their present shareowners, companies would adopt a manage-
ment style or pattern of behavior which would negate the usefulness of
the forecast.
Id., at 56.
80. Id., at 57.
81. Address by Leonard Spacek, Senior Partner Arthur Andersen & Co., No
Benefits Flow to Public Stockholders from One-Year Earnings Forecasts, before
the Financial Executives Institute, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Dec. 12, 1972.
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some accurate analysis of future growth could be designed, but
to suggest a one-year forecast as the financial panacea does
nothing more than create an atmosphere of false security."2
An argument has been proposed that the one-year's earnings
forecast only serves the salesman and the short term "in and out"
speculator because they will examine the forecast based on their
interpretations of the assumptions and gamble on the conserva-
tism or optimism of management- 3 If this "in and out" approach
is widely adopted it can only have adverse effects on the market.
It will also have the negative effect of reducing the long term in-
vestor to a short term gambler and markedly increase the volatil-
ity of the markets.
From the accountant's viewpoint, a second argument against
requiring one-year forecasts is: if an optimistic forecast is pub-
lished and not achieved, the public stockholder will claim that he
was misled. If, on the other hand, a conservative forecast is pub-
lished, such a goal is an invitation to operating personnel for medi-
ocre performance with the consequent result of a low return to
stockholders and a disgruntled investing public.8 4  Thus, any at-
tempt to burden management with a requirement to publish a
specific forecast of earnings will result in the existing shareholders
having every opportunity to lose and little opportunity to gain. 5
Additionally, an aura of accuracy may be attached to any formal
document executed by an accountant. In other words, the ad-
verse effect on the market would be greater if the forecast goals
were not achieved. Also, this report and its assumptions could
possibly create a new branch of fiduciary duties to the public, in
effect, another burden placed on the corporation and the account-
ant.
A third argument as to why one-year earnings forecasts are
not beneficial to the investing public is that the public accountant
could not corroborate the forecast without violating Rule 2-0486
82. Id., at 4.
83. Id., at 6.
84. Id., at 8.
85. Id., at 9.
86. See DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FoREcAsTs, supra note 66. As indicated
by the research study, Rule 2-04 of the Code of Professional Ethics of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants states that:
A member or associate shall not permit his name to be used in
conjunction with an estimate of earnings based upon future transac-
tions in a manner which may lead to the belief that the member or as-
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of the Code of Professional Ethics of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants. Strict adherence to this rule re-
quires an attestation by an independent third party to the earnings
forecast. Even if this rule were not observed closely, it has been
noted 7 that third party attestation of the assumptions used in de-
veloping forecasts would be misleading. There is no basis on
which the third party can challenge the assumptions made by sin-
cere management; to do so would mean that the attestor and not
the preparer had selected the assumptions."'
Independence of the public auditor is another issue raised
by adherence to this rule. One who attests to the assumptions
used in a forecast could not, under any circumstances, be deemed
independent with respect to the actual financial statements cover-
ing the same period. As a result, the company's independent
auditor must be disqualified from attesting to the assumptions
made in the forecast.89
If the investing public is to benefit from earnings forecasts
attested to by third parties, new standards for their presentation
must be established. Third party attestation ° cannot be based
on an assumption that the work will be done with due care and in
an objective manner, nor can there be an assumption that those
attesting have the ability to accept responsibility for the work.9
87. Address by Harvey Kapnick, Chairman and Chief Executive, Arthur
Andersen & Co., In the Matter of Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Eco-
nomic Performance, Securities and Exchange Commission, Dec. 1, 1972 [here-
inafter cited as Kapnick Address].
88. Id., at 3.
89. Id. See also W. PROSSER, TORTS 708 n.57 (4th ed. 1971).
90. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972).
91. See Kapnick Address, supra note 87, at 15. In his address before the
S.E.C., Chairman Kapnick recommended:
Keeping in mind the Commission's responsibilities to the investing
public, and based on my statement today, I recommend that the Com-
mission take the following action with respect to forecasted financial
data:
1. Require that information as to goals and facts related to the
future financial aspects of a company be made available to all
stockholders and the public whenever such information is provided
to anyone outside of the company.
2. Adopt regulations setting standards covering the preparation
and dissemination of forecasts by investment advisers.
3. Insist that the accounting profession set as its first order of
business the establishment of the objectives of financial statements.
4. Institute a study to determine what the investor needs to know
in order to reach an investment decision.
5. Disqualify as not independent any independent accountant who
attests to the assumptions in a forecast or reports that the assump-
tions have been chosen with due care from later reporting on the
historical financial statements covering the same period.
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In November, 1971, in a speech before the National Indus-
trial Conference Board, William J. Casey, then Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission spelled out the interest of
the Commission in profit forecasting by stating:
[T]he time has come to take a broader view of what is
pertinent to investment values and the obligation to convey
economic reality as management knows it to stockholders
and investors. I believe the time has come when we should
re-examine the question of the inclusion of projections, fore-
casts and appraisals in our disclosure framework.
92
In January, 1972, the Division of Corporate Finance of the
Securities and Exchange Commission invited certain groups di-
rectly concerned with corporate financing to meet with members
of the Commission's staff to discuss the availability of data neces-
sary for an informed review of profit forecasting.93 On June 28,
1972, representatives of the Commission met again to review the
status of the studies under consideration. 94  Chairman Casey an-
nounced on June 29, 1972, that the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission would await submission of reports by these groups before
making a formal statement regarding the inclusion of earnings
forecasts in registration statements or reports filed with the Com-
mission.95
In a further update of the Commission's position, it was re-
ported that the new proposals would require a company to dis-
close a description of the accounting principles it follows and, if
they differ from prevailing industry principles, to estimate the
dollar impact on net income on an annual basis. 6 Under these
new proposals, a company would have to determine the impact
on profits when it uses more than one accounting principle in re-
porting similar kinds of transactions." This is intended to eliminate
the technique used by corporations to select the set of accounting
principles most likely to enhance profits in their reports to inves-
92. Address by William J. Casey, Chairman of Securities and Exchange
Commission, Responsibilities and Liabilities in Corporate Life, before the Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board, Nov. 18, 1971, as indicated in DISCLOSURE
OF BUSINEss FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 81.
93. See DISCLOSURE OF BusINEss FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 81.
94. Id.
95. Id., at 81-82.
96. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1972, at 2, col. 2.
97. Id., at col. 3.
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tors.9 Another proposal indicated that guidelines should be es-
tablished to cover the contents and subsequent dissemination of
company news releases and interim financial reports. A decision
was reached by the Securities and Exchange Commission which
permits disclosing companies to include profit projections in re-
ports they file with the agency. But the Commission has decided
against requiring projections, although it had been under serious
consideration and was favored by many members of the Commis-
sion's staff.99
According to the new proposals, companies that decide to
file forecasts in their Securities and Exchange Commission filings
would include them in the annual 10-K forms presently filed with
the agency. They would also be required to update the forecasts
when necessary and to provide an annual analysis of their accu-
racy for consideration by the shareholders. 100 Recently the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, in its continuing effort to
tighten the controls over projections made by companies to financial
analysts and to the news media, announced that it was considering
requiring companies to file with the Commission any earnings
and sales projections made to securities analysts at analysts' meet-
ings, or other similar forums, including the press.1 1 The one
step that the Securities and Exchange Commission has chosen not
to take, however, is verification or certification of projections by
a third party. 102 In effect, the Commission has chosen not to
come in conflict with Rule 2-04.
From what has transpired to date, it would seem that the
Securities and Exchange Commission has chosen a middle-of-the-
road approach. Not wishing to incur the full wrath of the Amer-
98. The Impact of S.E.C.'s New Disclosure Rules, Bus. WEEK 58, Jan. 6,
1973.
99. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 1973, at 2, col. 2.
100. Id., at col. 3.
101. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 5, 1973, at 16, col. 1. Former S.E.C. Chair-
man William Casey stated that the quality of earnings is under attack in Bus.
WEEK 74, Dec. 23, 1972:
Investors want an earnings figure, and they want one which they
can rely on as a consistent measure of corporate performance and
progress, one not subject to manipulation. They want to know how
good the company is, how solid the earnings are, and how real the
growth is . .. . When the figures are elusive or too complicated to
grasp, investors have to base their judgment on their confidence in
management . . . Management has to tell it like it is . . . Credibility
can only be maintained by spelling out the facts, whether the account-
ants require it or not.
102. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 5, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
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ican business community, it has proposed voluntary disclosure
without the obligation of employing external auditors to become
associated with the forecast. More importantly, since the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's staff and the Commission mem-
bers have been sharply divided on whether to allow or require
these forecasts to be filed with the agency, the exit of Chairman
Casey will most probably have some impact on the final version
of these proposals." 3
B. Legal Problems Associated with Disclosure of Business
Forecasts'
0 4
The concern of the corporate managers regarding the legal
ramifications of profit forecasting is not associated with those who
would deliberately attempt to misguide the investing public.
Rather, it derives its origin from the very nature of forecasting it-
self and the possibility of litigation arising from the compulsory
disclosure of these estimates. 0 5 The emergence of increased lit-
igation in this area is inevitable, given the inexactness of fore-
casting and the demand for precision by the law.
103. Id.
104. See DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 98. In his
discussion concerning corporate managers' apprehension with regard to public
disclosure of corporate forecasts, Mr. Brown eloquently highlights the problem:
With regard to legal liabilities of managements and board of di-
rectors the formal publication of projected financial statements cannot
help but increase legal exposure. Financial performance significantly
better or worse than that projected seems clearly to be a basis for ac-
tion for damages. Where they were able to establish a deliberate
attempt to mislead third parties would have the same avenues for re-
dress as they do now. One gets into a gray area, however, when per-
formance differs significantly from plan and there has been an honest
attempt to (1) plan properly (2) make full disclosure (3) manage the
company as efficiently as possible. The recognition of this potential
new source of legal complications is one of the reasons why manage-
ment is not particularly enthusiastic about publishing forecasts in the
form of projected financial statements.
Brown, Ethical and Other Problems in Publishing Financial Forecasts, FINANCIAL
ANALYSTS J. 38, 41 (March-April, 1972).
105. See DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 99. As re-
ported by the researchers, one company executive stated:
Forecasting earnings is certainly not a precise art, and rarely are
such forecasts even acceptably accurate. If on the high side, a company
can be accused of attempting to influence the market price of its stock;
if on the low side, the forecast could have an unfortunate adverse
effect on the market price. In either situation the company may become
vulnerable to stockholders' suits by those who assert that they relied on
the forecast in connection with the purchase or sale of stock. The
company should not be placed in the position of having to expose itself
to such suits. [Emphasis added].
Id., at 46.
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Untrue statements of material facts or the failure to state a
material fact is prohibited by the Federal securities laws, and
civil liability is imposed for violations.10 6 However, according to
common law, corporate forecasts were mere expressions of opin-
ion; they were not a basis upon which an action for fraud or de-
ceit could be maintained if the prediction was not achieved.
10 7
Under present securities regulations, courts have found little diffi-
culty in concluding that forecasts were statements of fact and, as
such, were subject to the application of the anti-fraud or deceit
sections of those regulations.' Once the courts recognized that
forecasts disseminated to the investing public were subject to regula-
tion by the securities laws, the next logical step was to define the
test of materiality.
In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., the court stated that the basic
test of materiality is "whether 'a reasonable man would attach im-
portance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of
action in the transaction in question.' "109 This included any fact
"[W]hich in reasonable and objective contemplation might af-
fect the value of the corporation's stock or securities."'"10 The
concept of materiality and the "reasonable man" theory was ex-
tended in the Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company case:
106. See, e.g., §§ 11(a), 12(2), 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77(2), 77a(a); See also 10(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule lOb-5.
107. Id., at 100. See Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Se-
curities Regulations, 16 THE Bus. LAWYER 300, 307 n.18 (1961).
108. See DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 100. See,
e.g., Sprayregan v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), in
which the court found that for the first six months of the fiscal year 1964-65
that the company showed greatly reduced rather than greatly increased net
profits, as had been predicted, and the cash flow was significantly reduced rather
than improved; Janigan v. Taylor, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1962), afrd 344
F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) where the predic-
tion of future profitability by the owner and his subsequent purchase of shares
of stock for $20.00 per share based on his forecasts and then his sale of the
corporation two to three years later for $300.00 per share; S.E.C. v. F.S. Johns
& Co., 207 F. Supp. 566, 573 (D.N.J. 1962), where the court held that the ele-
ment of speculation is inherent in stock investments but the investor is entitled
to have the opportunity to evaluate the risk of loss, as against the hope of a
lucrative return, from true statements of the financial status of the corporate
enterprise in which he is acquiring an interest.
109. 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
See also DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 101.
110. Kohler v. Kohiler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963). See also
DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 101.
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[M]aterial facts include not only information disclosing the
earnings and distributions of a company, but also those facts
which affect the probable future of the company and those
which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold
the company's securities.' 11
The plethora of cases dealing with corporate forecasts com-
bined with the demand for more complete disclosure, clearly in-
dicate that business forecasts have been deemed "material facts"
and as such will be examined in the light of the Federal secur-
ities laws and regulations."1
2
There are no established standards against which one can
measure the accuracy of a forecast to determine whether its public
disclosure is misleading."' The British system allows for a plus
or minus ten percent variance before action is taken. In the
Kearney Study" 4 it was noted that thirteen percent of the re-
sponding companies' annual corporate earnings forecasts varied
by more than twenty-one percent." 5
If a forecast is inaccurate in its predictions by twenty-one per-
cent, does this justify labeling it as misleading? Prior to the
commencement of any litigation, the factors affecting that error
must be scrutinized. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the court stated that:
[I]f corporate management demonstrates that it was diligent
in ascertaining that the information it published was the
whole truth and that such diligently obtained information was
disseminated in good faith, Rule 10b-5 would not have been
violated. 116
However:
The requirement that a statement may not be found mislead-
ing unless its issuance is actuated by a "wrongful purpose"
for this might well have the effect of permitting the issuers
of misleading statements to seek an advantage but to escape
liability if the advantage fails to materialize to the degree
contemplated, or cannot be demonstrated."17
111. 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, sub. nom., Coates v.
S.E.C., 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra
note 66, at 102.
112. DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 103.
113. Id., at 109.
114. See note 66 supra.
115. See note 72 supra.
116. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (1968).
See also DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 109-10.
117. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861 (1968).
1973
25
Wahl: British Profit Forecasting System: Model or Mistake for the Unite
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
In a recent case, Dolgow v. Anderson,"' the Court quanti-
tatively analyzed the reasons behind the missed projection and set
forth a qualitative decision stating that:
Monsanto's management demanded that the internal docu-
ments and estimates be honest. The divisions of the cor-
poration made every effort to be accurate and honest in their
forecast. The internal estimates were made honestly, were
reasonable, and were the best estimates of the people in Mon-
santo most qualified to make them. 1 9
Recognizing the present pressure for more detailed corporate dis-
closure and the public clamor for a remedy for damages caused
by misleading forecasts, this approach would seem to fall far
short of a desired solution given the present state of the art of fore-
casting.1" 0
The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed that
forecasts be filed on a voluntary basis. What happens if
these forecasts are submitted in good faith but are not updated
by corporations as business and economic conditions dictate? A
corporation's failure to issue a public statement indicating prior
information disseminated to the public has become inaccurate,
can give rise to a cause of action under the Securities and Exchange
Rule lOb-5.1"1 Although the Court in Dolgow did not address it-
self to the specific requirements which would remove the burden
of the corporation to report the necessary changes and revisions
of their forecasts, it did analyze Monsanto's performance in light
of the altered business and economic conditions. It held that Mon-
santo avoided liability by exerting a good faith effort to update
their estimates and projections when economic conditions so war-
ranted.
1 22
The issue is: At what juncture does a forecast become material
and therefore in need of disclosure to the investing'public? The
Court in Texas Gulf Sulphur stated that:
We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed
immediately; the timing of disclosure is a matter for the busi-
ness judgment of the corporate officers entrusted with the
118. 53 F.R.D. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Wall Street Journal, Dec.
11, 1972, at 12, col. 5.
119. Id., at 676.
120. See DISCLOSURE OF BusINESs FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 112.
121. Id. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
122. 53 F.R.D. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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management of the corporation within the affirmative dis-
closure requirements promulgated by the exchanges and the
SEC.
1 23
Under the materiality test of Texas Gulf Sulphur:
[I]t may well be that certain of the assumptions arrived at
in the preparation of a forecast may reflect events which are
material and must be disclosed because of the 'indicated
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the com-
pany's activity.' This does not, however, dictate disclosure
of the forecast, but merely of the event.'
24
Corporations are therefore faced with a balancing effort to define
what is material and what is part of the ordinary day-to-day con-
duct of the business.12 It is not as important to establish the
quantitative requirements of materiality as it is to understand the
qualitative nature of the problem with which one is faced.
M. CONCLUSION
Our American prospectus has evolved from a selling doc-
ument into a boiler-plated liability-avoiding document. The
original purpose of the prospectus was as a selling tool, a
description of the company needed in the process of raising
the required capital and in presenting the story of the com-
pany fairly and accurately. As a result of the concentration
over the years on avoiding liability rather than sales, we have
left out the most important pieces of information from the
standpoint of both the buyer and the seller of securities .. .
and the vacuum between supply and demand is being filled,
as it Vy - bs "i y 1 l " 1nrmatn
26
The comparison of the British and the American systems dis-
closes some striking differences between the two which must be
resolved prior to any meaningful discussion regarding the intro-
duction of even a modified version of the British example
in the United States.
The basic structure of the British legal system, with the ab-
sence of class action suits and contingency fees, lends itself per-
123. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (1968).
See also DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FoRECAsTS, supra note 66, at 114.
124. DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra Note 66, at 114. See S.E.C.
v. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (1968).
125. See DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS FORECASTS, supra note 66, at 114.
126. Goldston Address, supra note 15, at 6.
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fectly to the implementation of such a forecasting system, without
the fear of litigation that is prevalent in the United States. The
British accountants are able to concentrate their efforts on pro-
viding a vital service to the investing public by reviewing the fore-
casts and discussing the assumptions contained therein with the
boards of directors, all within the framework of their Code of
Ethics. If restrictions are required, the British financial commu-
nity can itself apply and enforce informal sanctions. The success
of this approach is due in large measure to the closely-knit na-
ture of the financial community and the concomitant fear of em-
barrassment attributable to the possibility of expulsion for serious
wrongdoings.
The American financial community may be characterized
by its expansiveness and considerable reliance upon a constant
supply of "hot issues" to motivate investors. In contrast, the rec-
ognition of director liability has played an integral part in the de-
velopment of the British system. The responsibility and liability
of the director and the external auditor has been clearly defined.
If the forecasting system were adopted by the American financial
community, the directors of United States corporations could
expect to operate under a similar liability. The refusal of the
Securities and Exchange Commission to allow third party attesta-
tion of the voluntarily tendered business forecasts presents an-
other stumbling block. It appears that the only parties attesting
to the submitted forecast would be the company and its board of
directors, unless of course the company hired (at its own expense)
external auditors to reconstruct the forecast and comment on it.
This technique, without independent third party attestation,
would seem to lack purpose and would therefore lose credibility
with the investing public.
Even if the above items could be resolved successfully, there
would still exist a lack of precise forecasting in the future. The
demand for accurate figures in the financial community is of para-
mount importance. At the same time, the analytical value of a
one-year business forecast with a plus or minus fifteen or twenty
percent variance must be questioned seriously. The profit fore-
cast as now employed in the British system, given the present
state of the art of profit forecasting, would not significantly clar-
ify nor materially add to the financial data already presented to
the American investor. Moreover, it would constitute an increased
Vol. 4
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financial burden with the attendant possibility of expanded legal
liability. Therefore, introduction of a similar system in the United
States does not seem advisable at this time.
Timothy S. Wahl
APPENDIX:
AN EXAMPLE OF A BRITISH PROFIT FORECAST
The following is an extract from the report submitted by
Pilkington Brothers Ltd. to J. Henry Schroeder Wagg & Co. Ltd.,
the issuing bankers, on the occasion of the issue of § 56,287,260
ordinary shares in Pilkington in November 1970; and forming part
of the relevant prospectus:
"Based on the unaudited profits for the 179 days ended 26th
September 1970 and on revised budgets for the 186 days to 31st
March, 1971, taking into account the effect of the General Motors
Corporation strike up to the end of November, 1970 and, in the
absence of further unforeseen circumstances, the Board estimates
that the profits before taxation of the Group for the year ending
31st March, 1971, arrived at on the same basis as those set out
in the Accountants' Report will be approximately $ 10,400,000.
"The following table summarises the estimated profits for the
year ending 31 st March 197 1:
£ '000 £ '000
Trading profits before taxation but
after all other charges, including
amounts set aside for depreciation,
replacement and obsolescence, and
after deducting gross minority in-
terests ........... ....................- - 1,900
Licensing income and technical fees
less related expenditures 8,000
Share of profit attributable to the
Group's holding in associated com-
panies -------..--....----- ... - . ..--- - -  - 500
Profits before taxation 10,400
Deduct: Taxation, including cor-
poration tax on United Kingdom
profits at 42/ percent -- 4,250
Transfer to deferred taxation ac-
count ----------- 1,000 5,250
Profits after taxation .... ..........- 5,150
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Note: The trading profits are stated before deducting esti-
mated exceptional costs of £ 500,000 in connection with the
closing of a factory in Glasgow.
"Whilst recognizing the great difficulties involved in arriving
at such an estimate, the Board considers that the unofficial strike
in the United Kingdom caused a loss of profits of some £ 5,000,000.
Taking this into account, the adjusted estimate of the profits of
the Group for the year ending 31st March 1971 would be some
X 15,400,000 before taxation and some £ 8,000,000 after taxa-
tion."
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